I have said it before and I will say it again: If I could pick a major event from my life and live it over again — knowing what I know now — it would probably be the trip that I took to Moscow in 1991, arriving the week after the events that ended the Soviet Union.

There were still flowers on the sidewalks (near our hotel) where protesters were killed by Soviet tanks. There were Orthodox icons, as well. I was an evangelical Anglican, at that time, and really didn’t grasp the importance of many of the Orthodox people and places I encountered during that stay. I was there as part of the Moscow Project, an effort to help the emerging Russian Bible Society print 4 million Bibles.

One moment, in particular, was relevant to our discussion during this week’s belated “Crossroads” podcast (CLICK HERE to tune that in), which focused on a New York Times report about Ukraine and tensions in global Eastern Orthodoxy heading into this weekend and the holiest day on the Christian calendar — Pascha (Easter in the West).

I was visiting with a veteran Orthodox priest who was active in the Moscow Project. We were talking about the future of Russian Orthodox Church and the realities that would shape the next few decades. This is from an “On Religion” column on the topic. He said:

It’s impossible to understand the modern Russian church … without grasping that it has four different kinds of leaders. A few Soviet-era bishops are not even Christian believers. Some are flawed believers who were lured into compromise by the KGB, but have never publicly confessed this. Some are believers who cooperated with the KGB, but have repented to groups of priests or believers. Finally, some never had to compromise.

“We have all four kinds,” this priest said. “That is our reality. We must live with it until God heals our church.”

I bring this up, of course, because of the firestorm surrounding the words and actions of Patriarch Kirill, the current leader of the Russian Orthodox Church. In KGB documents, it appears that his codename was “Mikhailov” during the years before the 1991 coup.

How would Kirill be classified, using this priest’s typology? I am not aware of any public repentance for his KGB ties, but I have heard and read things that make me think he would be in category No. 2. I would urge journalists to do some pre-Ukraine war research, contrasting the times that he has praised the Vladimir Putin regime with the times that he has clashed with the government.

The result will, to say the least, be a mixed bag.

Allow me to stress that Orthodox leaders (much like their Catholic counterparts) are often much more active behind the scenes than in public. That was certainly the case when Russia invaded Georgia. I would also stress that, for the Orthodox (as with Catholics), it’s possible to fiercely disagree with some or even many of the words and actions of flawed ecclesiastical leaders without rejecting their efforts on other matters.

Are Orthodox believers outside of Russia upset or furious about Patriarch Kirill’s words of support for Putin? Yes. In particular, are they angry about how he has mixed his valid attempts (from the Orthodox point of view) to defend church teachings from cultural changes sweeping out of the Western world with Putin’s logic for the hellish Ukraine invasion? Yes, again.

What will the Orthodox do? Journalists would prefer headlines, but that is not how Orthodox hierarchs respond to this kind of crisis. As I have said before, I would urge journalists to keep an eye on the Patriarch of Antioch, as well as Orthodox leaders in Eastern Europe. In particular, it helps to talk to people (a) outside of New York City and (b) to Orthodox insiders who have long rejected Putin, but are not all that fond of, well, the European Union and leaders of Big Tech in America.

This brings us to the core material in that Times report, which ran with this headline: “Ukraine War Divides Orthodox Faithful.”

With the Eastern Orthodox Easter approaching this Sunday … tensions are rippling through the church’s more than 200 million faithful, concentrated in eastern and southern Europe. Around the world, the war is dividing national churches, parishes and even families as they reassess relations with Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Orthodox Church.

In the United States, some believers are switching churches. In France, Orthodox seminary students petitioned their bishop to break with the Moscow Patriarchate. In the Netherlands, the police had to intervene at a Rotterdam church after parishioners came to blows over the war. …

Doctrinal disputes and intrigues within the Eastern Orthodox Church often spool out over decades, if not centuries. But with remarkable speed, the war has widened schisms long kept below the surface.

Lots of that is valid, but it would sure help to have some attributions to support a statement such as “In the United States, some believers are switching churches.”

How big a trend is that? Who has documented it? The Times offers next to zero input on questions such as these.

Then there is this statement, once again delivered in magisterial Times voice and no on-the-record attribution:

In the United States, some adherents expressed anger that although the two main American branches of Russian origin, the Orthodox Church in America and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, had condemned the fighting and worked to help refugees, they avoided criticizing Patriarch Kirill directly.

An influx of converts in recent years, drawn by President Putin portraying himself as a bulwark against the West’s moral collapse, has intensified the wrangling.

Well now, there may be pro-Putin converts out there somewhere, but I have seen or heard nothing about that. Also, is a person pro-Putin — in Times-speak — if he or she (a) condemns the Ukraine invasion but (b) withholds sweeping judgment on the actions of the Russian Orthodox Church until Orthodox hierarchs around the world have reached a consensus?

Also, I’m active in an OCA parish that is majority convert (with some Russians and Romanians, as well) and we have had a wave of converts in the past two years. I have spent hours talking to these folks and I don’t think I have heard a word of Putin support. I have talked to folks who get the big picture: which is that Putin praises Orthodoxy and its role in Russian culture when it suits him and ignores the church when its doctrines don’t fit his politics (think abortion and some other major issues).

In other words, supporting efforts to promote Orthodoxy in Russian and elsewhere is not the same as backing (let alone applauding) Putin or many specific actions of Kirill.

On the issue of pro-Putin converts, did Times people talk to anyone outside of New York City or blue zip codes?

There is one other major hope in the Times story that should be mentioned.

It was totally valid — hear me say that — to emphasis the hellish impact of Putin’s invasion on efforts to bring peace between clashing Orthodox churches inside Ukraine. It is very important that many parishes and priests who have long been aligned with the older Orthodox body in Ukraine, with its historical ties to Russia, have spoken out against the Moscow Patriarchate.

Yet the story has nothing to say about the work and actions of that church’s leader, Metropolitan Onuphry, who has been active in his opposition to the invasion and has worked to cooperate with all kinds of efforts to pour aid to refugees and other victims of the conflict. When covering the tensions inside Ukraine, why ignore this crucial voice? Here is a passage from one of my “On Religion” columns:

"Defending the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, we appeal to the President of Russia and ask him to immediately stop the fratricidal war," said Metropolitan Onuphry, primate of Kiev and all Ukraine. "The Ukrainian and Russian peoples came out of the Dnieper Baptismal font, and the war between these peoples is a repetition of the sin of Cain, who killed his own brother out of envy. Such a war has no justification either from God or from people."

Metropolitan Onuphry, a native of Western Ukraine, added: "I call you, above all, to intensified penitential prayer for Ukraine, for our army, and our people, and I entreat you to lay aside mutual strife and misunderstandings and unite in love for God and our motherland."

The synod of bishops went further, urging Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia to personally seek "cessation of fratricidal bloodshed on Ukrainian land, and to call on the leadership of the Russian Federation to immediately stop the military actions that are already threatening to turn into a world war."

Come to think of it, it’s important to note the global Orthodox relief efforts focusing on Ukraine. That’s an important story.

That’s all for now, in part because I need to head back to church. Holy Week is ending and it is time for Pascha, a holy day which has quite a bit to say about the defeat of evil.

Enjoy the podcast and, please, pass it along to others.

FIRST IMAGE: Illustration from a Ukrainian Recipes website feature about symbolism in Ukrainian Pascha baskets.